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Abstract  
Does morality require mindreading? Moral psychologists believe mindreading is contingently 
involved in moral judgements. Moral philosophers argue that moral behaviour necessarily 
requires the possession of mindreading capacities. In this paper, I argue that, while the former 
may be right, the latter are mistaken. Using the example of empathy, I will show that a being 
with no mindreading capacities could behave on the basis of emotions that possess an 
identifiable moral content. There is, therefore, at least one type of moral motivation that does 
not require mindreading. This means that, a priori, non-mindreading animals can be moral.  
 
Word count: 8,971 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There appears to be something intuitively compelling about the idea that being a moral creature 
requires being able to mindread, understood as the capacity to conceptualise and attribute 
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mental states to others. The claim that one cannot be moral unless one possesses the ability to 
grasp (1) that others have interests, and (2) the impact that one’s actions can have on other 
beings’ mental lives, seems to be obviously correct. Many moral philosophers and moral 
psychologists have been seduced by the intuitive plausibility of this idea, and assume its 
veracity. In this paper, I intend to go against this common trend and argue that, despite 
appearances, morality does not require mindreading, and so, that a nonhuman creature may be 
moral, in the sense that she may be capable of behaving morally, even if she lacks mindreading 
capacities. 
 There are two main reasons why I want to make this argument. The first one is the 
intention of adding some conceptual clarity to debates on animal morality. What exactly do we 
mean when we ask whether animals are moral? It is common to link morality to prosociality. 
However, not all behaviour that is prosocial is necessarily moral. For example, Nowbahari et al. 
(2009) found that ants will reliably free non-anesthetised conspecifics who are trapped in a 
snare. The ants’ behaviour is surely prosocial, since it benefits others in the colony, but we 
cannot assert that it is moral until we determine what motivates the ants to behave this way, for 
it is in the underlying motivations that morality can be found. Vasconcelos et al. (2012) have 
distinguished between behaviour that is functionally intended to benefit another—i.e. behaviour 
that has been favoured by natural selection because it contributes to this end—, and behaviour 
that is psychologically intended to benefit another. They assert that the latter only applies when 
the behaviour in question is ‘goal-directed towards acting on the actor’s internal representation 
of the receiver’s wellbeing’ (Vasconcelos et al., 2012, p. 911, my emphasis), which would 
appear to link morality to mindreading capacities. While this may be sufficient for moral 
behaviour, I shall argue that we can conceive of more minimal forms of morality that will not 
require mindreading capacities while, at the same time, ensuring that not all prosocial behaviour 
qualifies as moral. 
 The second motivation behind this paper stems from the current situation in 
experimental studies on animal cognition. On the one hand, there is a growing amount of 
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evidence that suggests the presence of something akin to moral behaviour in quite a large 
number of species, including monkeys (Masserman et al., 1964; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 
2008), great apes (O’Connell, 1995; Clay & de Waal, 2013; Palagi & Norscia, 2013), elephants 
(Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006; Bates et al., 2008; Plotnik & de Waal, 2014), cetaceans (Porter, 
1977; Park et al., 2012), canids (Cools et al., 2008; Custance & Mayer, 2012; Palagi & Cordoni, 
2009), rodents (Church, 1959; Rutte & Taborsky, 2007; Bartal et al., 2011; Sato et al., 2015) 
and corvids (Seed et al., 2007; Fraser & Bugnyar, 2010). On the other hand, however, debates 
on mindreading capacities in animals are dominated by a rather pessimistic attitude on behalf of 
researchers, as there is only a limited amount of evidence, which is largely restricted to great 
apes and corvids, and is viewed as deeply problematic by several prominent researchers (for a 
review on the current state of this debate, see: Lurz, 2011). Arguing for the logical 
independence of morality and mindreading presents itself as a crucial endeavour, if we want to 
ensure that the discouraging results in the animal mindreading debate don’t trump the possibility 
of concluding that (some) animals are nevertheless moral.  
 This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I discuss the relationship between 
mindreading and moral judgement, as it is viewed from the eyes of moral psychologists. While I 
shall concede that it seems entirely plausible that moral judgement requires mindreading 
capacities, I will also show that this does not affect the case I want to make in this paper, as my 
concern lies specifically in moral behaviour. In the second part, I will argue against Cova (2013)  
and Nichols (2001); two philosophers who have, for different reasons, defended the claim that 
moral behaviour requires mindreading. Making use of the conceptual framework developed by 
Rowlands (2011, 2012), I will show that neither of them has succeeded in establishing a 
necessary connection between morality and mindreading. To make my case, I shall refer to the 
hypothetical example of an emotion that I shall term minimal moral empathy. In the final part of 
this paper, I shall present a more systematic definition of this emotion and some further 
considerations to defend the idea that, while this emotion would not require mindreading, it 
would nevertheless be moral in character. 
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2. Mindreading and Moral Judgement 
 
Moral judgement, understood as the process whereby we subject situations, behaviours, 
motivations, etc. to scrutiny in order to determine their moral status, is commonly thought to 
engage our mindreading capacities. This is a claim that is backed up by a good deal of empirical 
research. Several studies from developmental psychology suggest that a higher development of 
children’s mindreading capacities is positively correlated with more sophisticated performance 
in moral reasoning and moral judgement tasks (Baird & Astington, 2004; Cushman et al., 2013; 
Dunn et al., 2000; Lane et al., 2010; Piazzarollo Loureiro & de Hollanda Souza, 2013). 
Furthermore, moral psychologists have found evidence in adult humans of a strong reliance of 
moral judgements upon the attribution of mental states, especially intentions (Cushman, 2008; 
Darley et al., 1978; Woolfolk et al., 2006). And lastly, studies in social neuroscience have also 
found that brain areas that are associated with mindreading are often activated during moral 
judgement and moral reasoning tasks (Bzdok et al., 2012; Harenski et al., 2009; Young et al., 
2007; Young & Saxe, 2008).  
 With this sort of research in mind, several authors have postulated that mindreading 
capacities  play a crucial role in (human) moral judgement. Guglielmo et al. (2009, p. 449), for 
instance, have defended that in order to judge that a certain behaviour was intentional, and thus 
blameworthy, people require, amongst other things, ‘evidence for the agent’s desire for an 
outcome, beliefs about the action in question leading to the outcome, the intention to perform 
the action, awareness of the act while performing it’ (Guglielmo et al., 2009, p. 451, their 
emphasis), the evaluation of which engages our mindreading capacities. Gray et al. (2012) have 
asserted that the essence of morality is ‘the combination of harmful intent and painful 
experience’ (Gray et al., 2012, p. 106), and so, at the heart of most moral judgements, lies the 
perception of a dyad of mental states: harmful intent on behalf of the agent, and painful 
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experience on behalf of the patient. Young and Waytz (2013) assert that the main role of our 
mindreading capacities can be found in moral cognition, as they constitute a fundamental 
mechanism when it comes to understanding the actions of moral agents, predicting those actions 
of others that will affect us, as well as determining who is our ally and who our enemy (Young 
& Waytz, 2013, p. 93).  
 What these different authors are claiming is that people’s moral judgements involve 
mindreading. This is something I’m not interested in disputing. In fact, I think it’s a plausible 
and empirically supported claim. My interest is in arguing against a slightly different idea, 
namely, that mindreading capacities are a necessary requirement for moral behaviour. When 
these authors claim that ‘at the heart of morality lies folk psychology’ (Guglielmo et al., 2009, 
p. 449), that ‘mind perception is the essence of morality’ (Gray et al., 2012, p. 101), or that 
‘mind attribution is for morality’ (Young & Waytz, 2013, p. 93), they are not defending the 
thesis I want to challenge. There are two important differences between the claim made by these 
authors and the one I want to debunk. The first difference is that, despite their use of the term 
‘morality,’ these authors’ common claim is one that refers to moral judgement, and not to moral 
behaviour. What they are asserting is that, at the heart of our capacity to engage in moral 
judgement, lies our capacity to attribute mental states to others. They generally do not address 
the question of whether behaving morally, that is, on the basis of motivations that are moral in 
character, requires the presence or involvement of mindreading capacities—which is precisely 
where my interest lies.  
 At this point, one could well ask whether moral behaviour can ever be separated from 
moral judgement, and indeed, the intuition that moral behaviour involves moral judgement is 
one of the reasons why philosophers defend the idea that morality requires mindreading. I shall 
argue against this intuition more carefully in the following sections, but for now, it suffices to 
introduce the conceptual framework offered by Rowlands (2011, 2012), and distinguish 
between moral subjects and moral agents. Rowlands has argued that the key to advancing the 
animal morality debate is to acknowledge that we can separate moral motivation from moral 
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responsibility. Accordingly, the category of moral subject refers to individuals who sometimes 
behave on the basis of moral motivations, and the label of moral agent applies only to those 
moral subjects who can be held morally responsible for their behaviour. All moral agents are 
moral subjects, but not necessarily vice versa. The notion of moral subjecthood allows us to 
make sense of the idea that moral behaviour may sometimes obtain in the absence of moral 
responsibility. This enables us, for instance, to describe the behaviour of a child who is a bully 
or a mentally ill person who commits a crime as morally bad, even though different 
considerations may prevent us from holding them responsible or blaming them for their 
behaviour. Among the considerations that would determine to which extent they are morally 
responsible, would lie the question of whether these two individuals can fully understand and 
properly engage in moral judgements. If they can’t understand that what they have done is 
morally bad, it doesn’t make much sense to hold them morally responsible for their behaviour.1 
On the other hand, it seems much less controversial to say that what they did was morally bad. 
In the following section, I will argue that while moral agency almost certainly requires moral 
judgement, this is not the case for moral subjecthood. 
 The second big difference between the claim Guglielmo et al. (2009), Gray et al. (2012), 
and Young & Waytz (2013) defend and the one I want to dispute is that these authors are stating 
a contingent fact about (human) morality, and not describing a necessary one. Their arguments 
are made after empirical examinations of people’s moral judgements in different circumstances. 
What is being argued is not that mindreading must be involved in order for one to perform a 
moral judgement, but rather, that mindreading is actually involved whenever people judge the 
morality of others’ behaviour. The idea that (normal adult) humans make use of their 
mindreading capacities whenever they engage in moral judgements is not one that I intend to 
question. Even if these authors were defending the claim that humans engage in the attribution 
of mental states to others whenever they behave morally (as seems to be suggested by Young & 
Waytz, 2013, pp. 97–100), I would not be interested in disputing that claim, either. This is 
                                                      
1 Cova (2013) has positioned himself against this claim. I shall address his ideas in the following section. 
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because, if it were true that all human moral behaviour involves mindreading de facto, it would 
not follow that moral behaviour necessarily involves mindreading. My interest lies precisely in 
arguing that mindreading does not have to be involved in order for a behaviour or a motivation 
to count as moral, and moreover, that an individual does not have to possess mindreading 
capacities to be a moral subject. These scholars do not take a stand on this issue.  
 I want to argue that morality does not require mindreading, and this should be 
understood as the claim that there may be creatures that are moral subjects even though they 
lack mindreading capacities. As stated in the introduction, I will understand that behaviour is 
moral when it has been triggered by motivations of the appropriate sort. Asserting that moral 
subjecthood does not require mindreading capacities amounts to claiming that certain 
individuals who lack these capacities may nevertheless behave on the basis of motivations that 
are moral in character. To state the obvious, I do not intend to argue that non-mindreaders may 
behave on the basis of any moral motivation whatsoever. The absence of mindreading capacities 
may preclude them from being the subjects of certain kinds of moral motivations, such as 
considerations of the following form: ‘I want to φ, but if I φ, then Jones will suffer; making 
people suffer is morally wrong, so I should refrain from φing.’ Accordingly, my claim is a rather 
restricted one, namely, that there is at least one kind of moral motivation that does not require 
the possession of mindreading capacities—what I shall term minimal moral emotions. 
 
3. Mindreading and Moral Behaviour 
 
In the previous section, we saw that empirical evidence from disciplines such as developmental 
psychology and social neuroscience has led some moral psychologists to assert that 
mindreading capacities are (contingently) involved whenever humans engage in moral 
judgements. As stated above, I do not intend to discuss this claim. Instead, I will focus, in this 
section, on two philosophers who have defended the idea that moral behaviour necessarily 
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requires mindreading capacities: Cova (2013) and Nichols (2001). They both seem untroubled 
by the idea that animals may be moral, and offer an account of the minimal cognitive 
requirements for morality that they interpret as allowing animals into the realm of moral 
creatures (Cova, 2013, pp. 128–9; Nichols, 2001, p. 450). While I sympathise with the de-
intellectualised accounts of morality that they put forward, I worry that their inclusion of 
mindreading amongst these cognitive requirements may serve to undermine the possibility of 
animal morality. I believe, however, that neither of them succeeds in establishing a necessary 
connection between mindreading and moral behaviour. In this section, I will attempt to refute 
their arguments, and defend the idea that minimal forms of morality that do not require the 
capacities for moral judgement or mindreading are perfectly conceivable, and indeed, entirely 
plausible. 
3.1. Cova (2013): Mindreading Is for Caring 
Cova (2013) distinguishes two positions in the animal morality debate: (1) continuism, or the 
idea that some of the capacities that make humans moral are present, if somewhat rudimentarily, 
in some nonhuman species, and (2) discontinuism, or the thesis that only humans posses these 
capacities. In a similar vein as Rowlands, Cova argues that in order to make progress in debates 
on animal morality, we need to introduce modifications into the way we use our moral terms. 
However, in contrast to Rowlands’ (2011, 2012) proposal of separating moral motivation from 
moral responsibility, Cova (2013) argues that the disagreement amongst continuists and 
discontinuists can be at least partially solved by separating moral judgement from moral agency. 
He understands moral agency as the quality of being ‘morally responsible of (some of) [one’s] 
action’ and moral judgement as the ability to ‘judge whether something is right or wrong’ 
(Cova, 2013, p. 118). The key to solving the debate, according to Cova, is realising that one can 
be a continuist about moral agency and a discontinuist about moral judgement, and thus, that we 
can establish that ‘we share the psychological bases for moral agency with other animals’ while 
acknowledging that ‘we are the only known species able to form moral judgments’ (Cova, 2013, 
p. 118). 
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 In order to defend his position, Cova attempts to construct an account of moral agency 
without moral judgement. To this end, he gives a series of examples of people performing good 
or bad deeds without stopping to reflect on their goodness or badness, and argues that it is 
counterintuitive to consider that the agents were not morally responsible for these actions just 
because they didn’t execute their moral judgement capacities while performing them. It seems, 
however, that he is not properly addressing the issue at hand, because in all the cases he 
considers the agents are healthy adult humans who do have moral judgement capacities. As a 
result, they can understand (even if they haven’t stopped to reflect upon it in these particular 
instances) that what they’re doing is right or wrong, and that they should be praised or blamed 
for it. Cova does not succeed in showing that this isn’t part of the reason why their actions are 
worthy of praise or blame. For example, Cova considers the following case: 
Let’s say that Jack had a bad day, was irritated, and smashed the window [sc. of the car 
parked in front of him] without taking the time to assess whether it was right or wrong. 
Let’s also say that, though he realized afterwards that it was the wrong thing to do, he 
did not regret this action at great length. Should we say that Jack is not responsible and 
does not deserve blame for what he did? That he hasn’t the duty to pay for repairs? That 
seems very counter-intuitive. (Cova, 2013, p. 123) 
An obvious response would be to say that the fact that Jack has moral judgement capacities, but 
has failed to make proper use of them, is an important part of what warrants our holding him 
morally responsible for his action. The fact that he has these capacities does, indeed, make it 
counterintuitive to say that he is not responsible. On the other hand, if Jack were a severely 
disabled individual who lacked all capacity to understand that what he did was wrong, then 
holding him responsible or making him pay for repairs would also be very counterintuitive. 
Cova does not put forward any argument to prevent us from interpreting his examples this way.  
 Cova’s characterisation of a ‘mere’ moral agent is also a rather awkward one. He states 
that a moral agent that were incapable of engaging in moral judgements would be ‘responsible 
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for his action’ but that this would not ‘necessarily entail that he can be punished,’ because ‘one 
has to be both a moral agent and a moral judge to be an appropriate target of punishment’ 
(Cova, 2013, p. 129). Cova defends this last claim by appealing to his own intuition (‘it seems 
to me that we want the people we punish to understand why they are punished’), and also to an 
experimental study by Gollwitzler and Denzler (2009) that suggests that people ‘consider 
revenge satisfactory only if the offender understands (and acknowledges) that revenge was 
taken against him because and in virtue of a prior unfair behaviour’ (Cova, 2013, p. 129). 
However, unless we speak of degrees of moral responsibility (which Cova does not), it is very 
difficult to see how someone can fulfil the cognitive requirements for being held morally 
responsible for an offense and for this not to entail that she can be punished. It seems that any 
consideration that made reference to the individual’s personal characteristics (and not to 
circumstantial facts) and served to undermine the legitimacy of punishment would also entail 
that the person in question is not a full-blown moral agent. The whole point of holding someone 
morally responsible is to open the possibility of praising or blaming her, and rewarding or 
punishing her if the circumstances warrant it. Cova’s appeal to the intuition that those we punish 
need to understand why they are punished only works against his own interest, because it points, 
precisely, to the fact that moral responsibility and moral judgement cannot be separated.  
 We have seen that Cova’s argumentative strategy to defend the logical independence of 
moral agency and moral judgement is unsatisfactory, and also, that his characterisation of a 
‘mere’ moral agent is rather counterintuitive. However, the most important point that needs to 
be made here is a more fundamental one, namely, that Cova does not need to separate moral 
agency from moral judgement. He does not need to do so, because he is merely trying to make 
sense of behaviours that can be morally motivated, that occur ‘for good reasons’ (Cova, 2013, p. 
127 his emphasis), in the absence of moral judgement capabilities. Appealing to the category of 
moral subjecthood is a much easier way of achieving this. An individual who can behave on the 
basis of morally good reasons (or morally bad ones) is a moral subject. If that subject also 
possesses the ability to engage in moral judgements, then she is also a moral agent, and can be 
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held responsible (and, thus, praised or blamed) for her behaviour. This allows us to make sense 
of the morality of the examples Cova uses even if we suppose that the subjects involved lack all 
capacity to engage in moral judgements. At the same time, we can also avoid the awkward 
consequences that come from separating moral agency from moral judgement. 
 I have a further concern with Cova’s paper, which will bring us to the issue of 
mindreading. It seems to me that he doesn’t fully succeed in separating moral behaviour from 
moral judgement. To see why this is so, let us consider one of his main aims in this paper, 
which is to give a minimal account of what it means to act for morally good reasons. Cova 
reaches the conclusion that ‘one acts for the good reasons when one actually cares about the 
person one is trying to help’ (Cova, 2013, p. 127). In order to be able to say that an individual 
cares for another, two conditions must be met, according to Cova: (1) she must be ‘able to 
understand that this person has interests,’ and (2) she must ‘give an intrinsic (i.e. non-
instrumental) positive value to the fact that this person’s interests are preserved and augmented’ 
(Cova, 2013, p. 127, his emphasis). These two conditions, in his view, mean that being a moral 
creature only requires ‘[acting] according to what we attach importance to and a bit of theory of 
mind [i.e. mindreading capacities]’ (Cova, 2013, p. 128).  
 Cova, therefore, considers that mindreading capacities must be present in order to be 
able to say that an individual cares for others, and thus that she helps others for morally good 
reasons. My reason for thinking that Cova does not succeed in letting go of moral judgement 
capacities resides in the other condition he puts forward, namely, the idea that the moral 
individual must also be capable of attaching importance or giving an intrinsic positive value to 
the preservation of others’ interests. Attaching importance or giving a positive value to X seems 
to mean, precisely, (consciously or unconsciously) judging that X is a good thing. How is this 
different from moral judgement? How can a person attach importance to something without the 
ability to engage in moral judgements? Cova does not offer a solution to this question, which 
means it poses a potential threat to his whole argument. I believe, however, that there is a way 
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around this problem; a way that will allow us to effectively separate moral behaviour from 
moral judgement, and additionally, from mindreading capacities. 
 My proposal is the following. We can construct a minimal account of care that will not 
require the ability to (consciously or unconsciously) judge that preserving someone’s interests is 
a good thing, by focusing on the emotions that an individual might undergo when deciding to 
help someone. So, let’s imagine an individual called Higgins who feels sad whenever he sees 
others in distress. Let’s imagine that this sadness is what triggers Higgins’ urge to help or 
comfort them, and that he feels happy once they’re no longer in distress. Even if Higgins were 
incapable of engaging in moral judgements, Rowlands’ (2012) framework allows us to 
categorise Higgins’ behaviour as moral because it is motivated by an emotion that tracks the 
moral proposition ‘This creature’s distress is bad.’ An emotion can be said to track a moral 
proposition if there is a truth-preserving relation between the emotion and the proposition in 
question, so that the truth of the proposition is guaranteed whenever the emotion is not 
misguided (see section 4 below; Rowlands, 2012, Chapters 2, 9).  
 To see what this means, imagine that Higgins is sad because he sees that Jane is crying, 
and that his sadness is intentionally directed at Jane’s crying, that is, Higgins is sad that Jane is 
crying. His being sad that Jane is crying means he is experiencing Jane’s crying as something 
unpleasant; as something bad. Built into his sadness at Jane’s crying is an urge to comfort her. 
This experiential form that Higgins’ emotion takes is what allows us to speak of it tracking the 
proposition ‘This creature’s distress is bad’ (see also section 4). Now, suppose that Jane’s 
crying were due to an entirely mundane reason, such as the fact that she’s watching a sad film. 
Or suppose that Jane had committed a serious offense and her crying was the result of her well-
deserved punishment. In these cases, Jane’s crying would (at least arguably) not be a bad thing. 
Higgins’ sadness would then be misguided, because he would be experiencing as bad something 
that is not, in fact, a bad thing. This is what it means to say that the truth of the proposition ‘This 
creature’s distress is bad’ is guaranteed by the non-misguided status of Higgins’ emotion. 
 13 
 
 The idea of emotions that track moral propositions allows us to separate moral 
behaviour from moral judgement entirely. We do not need Higgins to be capable of entertaining 
a proposition such as ‘This creature’s distress is bad.’ Higgins can lack all capacity to engage in 
moral judgements and still be a moral subject, because the morality of his behaviour comes by 
virtue of the fact that it is triggered by an emotion that tracks a moral proposition. And here 
comes the crucial bit—since we can let go of all capacity to entertain the proposition ‘This 
creature’s distress is bad,’ we can also let go of all capacity to entertain the proposition ‘This 
creature is distressed.’ That is, we do not need Higgins to be capable of attributing any mental 
states to others, because what is important is that he reliably undergoes sadness when witnessing 
someone’s distress. It is enough for his sadness to be triggered by, and intentionally directed at, 
the superficial behavioural cues that accompany Jane’s distress—we do not need him to 
understand anything about the underlying mental states. 
 For Higgins to be a minimal moral subject, we need his behaviour to be motivated, at 
times, by a (minimal) moral emotion. This (minimal) moral emotion can be of different sorts. In 
the example I have been using, Higgins is motivated by an emotion we can call minimal moral 
empathy2 (see section 4 for a definition of this notion). For this specific kind of moral emotion 
to obtain, Higgins must possess a reliable mechanism that ensures that, upon detection of the 
superficial markers of distress in others, he experiences an emotional contagion that results in an 
affective state that is intentionally directed at the state-of-affairs that is the other individual in 
distress. We need the resulting emotion to be what moves Higgins to help or comfort the other. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, Higgins will be a moral subject, regardless of whether or not he 
is a moral judge, a mindreader, or indeed, a human being. 
3.2. Nichols (2001): Mindreading Is for Motivation 
                                                      
2 I use this cacophonous phrase, instead of merely the term ‘empathy,’ to distinguish the concept the former refers to 
from the many uses of the term ‘empathy’ that can be found in the literature, many of which refer to abilities that are 
either not moral (e.g. de Vignemont & Jacob, 2012; Gallagher, 2012; Goldman, 2006; Zahavi, 2010), or far from 
minimal (e.g. Dixon, 2008; Jamison, 2014). 
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Minimal moral empathy (MME) would be an example of what Nichols (2001) considers the 
most ‘radical’ view of the relationship between mindreading and altruistic motivation, namely, 
the view that mindreading is not required for altruistically-motivated behaviour to occur 
(Nichols, 2001, p. 426). In this paper, his aim is to give a minimal account of what he considers 
one of the ‘basic moral capacities: the capacity for altruistic motivation’ (Nichols, 2001, p. 425). 
To this end, he focuses on the core cases of altruistic motivation, that is, those that result in 
‘comforting or helping others in distress’ (Nichols, 2001, p. 428). These cases, according to 
Nichols, cannot be adequately accounted for from the ‘radical’ view because only mindreading 
capacities can ensure that one is motivated to help another when escaping is easier. Continuing 
with our previous example, Nichols would say that the lack of mindreading capacities will mean 
that Higgins, due to his emotional contagion, experiences Jane’s distress as ‘bad music’ that 
he’d like to turn off, and escaping will be just as good a solution as comforting her (Nichols, 
2001, p. 429). Possessing mindreading capacities, on the other hand, would mean that ‘escape is 
not an adequate alternative’ because ‘the motivation comes from an enduring internal cause’ 
(Nichols, 2001, p. 435, his emphasis). If Higgins possessed mindreading capacities and merely 
removed himself from the situation, his motivation to help Jane would remain, for it would not 
have been triggered by mere superficial cues, but by a representation of her distress. 
 The most obvious response here would be to argue that MME can also trigger an 
‘enduring internal cause.’ We are not supposing that Higgins’ emotional contagion results in 
self-directed personal distress, or in a form of distress with no intentional object, but rather, that 
as a result of his emotional contagion, Higgins is distressed that Jane is displaying distress 
behaviour. Jane’s distress behaviour is the intentional object of Higgins’ distress—he 
experiences it emotionally as distressing. If the emotional contagion gives rise to an emotion 
that is intentionally directed at Jane’s distress behaviour, then the cause of Higgins’ distress can 
persist in his mind even after he escapes the situation. Nichols considers this possibility but 
dismisses it: 
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An emotional contagion theorist might continue to deny any role for mindreading and 
maintain that altruistic motivation comes from an enduring representation of the 
behavioral, acoustic, or physiognomic cues that cause emotional contagion. ... The 
problem is that ... if one knows that the cues leading to emotional contagion are merely 
superficial, this typically does not prevent one from experiencing emotional contagion, 
but it does undermine altruistic motivation. (Nichols, 2001, p. 435) 
This response is unsatisfactory because it presupposes that the being in question possesses 
mindreading capacities and can ‘[know] that the cues leading to emotional contagion are merely 
superficial.’ If an individual were to lack mindreading capacities altogether, then she wouldn’t 
be capable of distinguishing ‘merely superficial’ cues from those that are markers of underlying 
mental states, and so there is no reason to suppose that the superficial cues couldn’t provide the 
adequate motivation. All that is required is for the individual’s past learning experiences or 
innate behavioural tendencies to move him to engage in affiliative behaviour as a result of his 
(intentional) emotional contagion. 
 Instead of giving an account of altruistic motivation based on emotional contagion, 
Nichols proposes that the attribution of distress to others may be precisely what triggers the 
affective process that results in a motivation to behave altruistically. This is what Nichols terms 
the ‘Concern Mechanism,’ which he proposes as underlying much of our altruistic behaviour, 
and would work as follows: 
The distress attribution might produce a kind of second order empathic distress in the 
subject. For example, representing the sorrow of the target might lead one to feel 
sorrow. This would provide a kind of empathic motivation for helping. And the 
motivation would be effective even when escape is easy. For the cause of the emotion is 
still the representation of the other’s mental state and as a result, one is motivated not 
simply to escape the situation since that would not rid one of the representation. 
(Nichols, 2001, pp. 445–6) 
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 We have seen that there is no reason to suppose that emotional contagion cannot trigger 
an enduring representation. At the same time, there is no reason to suppose that ‘escaping the 
situation’ cannot rid one of the representation of another’s distress. We have all experienced 
being overwhelmed by a particularly tragic story in the news and changing channel to avoid 
being put off our dinner. There need not be any images of people in distress that could trigger an 
emotional contagion for this to occur. It could simply be the case that a journalist is reporting a 
story that makes us very aware of the suffering of the people involved in it. By changing 
channel, we become distracted and thus stop thinking about their distress—that is to say, our 
internal representation of it is ‘turned off.’ Of course, the cases that Nichols is thinking about 
are those in which we are faced with the dilemma of helping the person in distress or leaving the 
scenario—in this respect my example is not a perfect analogy. Nevertheless, it serves to 
illustrate the fact that having an internal representation of someone’s distress does not mean that 
it must endure once we escape the situation—we can, after all, make the effort to become 
distracted and think about something else. Having mindreading capacities does not ensure that 
one will help when escaping is easier. The ‘Concern Mechanism’ that Nichols proposes would 
therefore not necessarily be infallible. The same applies to MME, about which we can never say 
that it will necessarily result in comforting or helping behaviour—there could always be other 
intervening factors that motivate the individual towards a different behavioural outcome. For 
both Nichols’ ‘Concern Mechanism’ and MME to result in helping or comforting behaviour, a 
number of further conditions must probably obtain: the individual must have the right beliefs, 
her relation to the distressed person must be of a certain sort, there must not be any other 
pressing issue to attend to, and so on. 
 It is important to emphasise that Nichols is directing his arguments at the thesis that all 
altruistic motivation is caused by emotional contagion,3 and this is not what I’m interested in 
defending. It certainly seems plausible to me that something akin to Nichols’ ‘Concern 
                                                      
3 He also criticises the alternative thesis that all altruistic behaviour is triggered by perspective taking 
processes. This part of his argument is irrelevant for my purposes, which is why I leave it aside. 
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Mechanism’ may be at the basis of much human (perhaps even nonhuman) altruistic behaviour. 
My point is that MME may also be a kind of altruistic motivation and that the arguments put 
forward by Nichols do not succeed in proving otherwise. Of course, whether MME ever does 
take place is an empirical matter on which I take no stand. My interest is in arguing that, if an 
individual (at times) behaved on the basis of moral emotions such as MME, then she would be a 
moral subject, regardless of whether or not she possessed mindreading capacities.  
  
4. What Makes Minimal Moral Empathy Moral? 
 
In the previous section, I have shown that the arguments put forward by Cova (2013) and 
Nichols (2001) to defend a necessary connection between mindreading and moral behaviour are 
not convincing. In the process, I have presented the notion of MME as an example of a 
hypothetical caring or helping motivation that would be entirely independent of mindreading 
and moral judgement. An obvious objection emerges at this point: sure, the reader may say, 
MME does not require the possession of mindreading capacities or the ability to engage in 
moral judgements, and it may indeed be enough to trigger helping or comforting behaviour, but 
what reason do we have to believe that this is a moral emotion? What warrants the attribution of 
moral subjecthood to those who behave on the basis of MME? This is a very important 
objection, since failing to address it correctly would mean that I have not succeeded in my 
defence of the independence of morality and mindreading. I have thus chosen to devote this last 
section to disentangling what makes MME moral. Let us begin by defining this notion more 
carefully: 
Creature C possesses minimal moral empathy (MME) if: (1) C has an ability to detect 
distress behaviour in others, and (2) due to the action of a reliable mechanism, the 
detection of distress behaviour in others results in a process of emotional contagion that 
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(3) generates an emotion with the other's distress behaviour as its intentional object, 
built into which is (4) an urge to engage in other-directed affiliative behaviour. 
 To determine whether or not MME-based behaviour would be moral, we would have to 
first establish what makes a certain behaviour deserve this label. In the introduction, I already 
hinted at a sufficient (if not necessary) condition for determining that a behaviour is moral, 
namely, whether it has been triggered by a moral motivation. Now, this of course puts the 
explanandum in the explanans, but it is not an entirely vacuous definition. It means that we 
cannot determine whether a behaviour is moral solely by looking at its outer characteristics, but 
rather, that we must also look at its underlying motivations. The key question, then, is what 
makes a motivation moral. Since there is no universally accepted definition of morality, it 
would be very difficult, and surely beyond the scope of this paper, to give an explanation that 
would satisfy everyone. There are, however, a number of considerations that can be made about 
MME, which taken together build quite a strong case for its moral character. To see this, let’s 
return to the Higgins example, now explicitly thinking of Higgins as a nonhuman individual, 
such as a dog. Here are the reasons why he should be considered a moral subject: 
 1. Even though Higgins cannot conceptualise and attribute to others the mental state that 
underlies displays of distress behaviour, his emotional contagion occurs in the presence of 
others in distress. This is important insofar as distress, together with other affective states such 
as pain, is a morally relevant feature of situations. This is something about which most (if not 
all) theories in normative ethics will agree. From the point of view of normative ethics, whether 
an action produces distress in others or not is something that must generally be taken into 
account when deciding how to act or how to evaluate the actions of others. Higgins possesses an 
emotional sensitivity to this morally relevant feature, since he not only feels sad whenever he 
sees others in distress, but also experiences their distress behaviour emotionally as distressing. 
Higgins may also experience the noise of the vacuum cleaner emotionally as distressing, but this 
sensitivity would not be a moral one because vacuum cleaning noises are not morally relevant 
features of situations, whereas distress behaviour is a pretty reliable marker of the bad-making 
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feature of situations that is distress as a mental state. And Higgins’ sensitivity is not accidental 
or contingent, but rather, has been caused by what Rowlands (2012, Chapters 5, 9) would call a 
‘moral module,’ that is, a mental process such as a perception-action mechanism (Preston & de 
Waal, 2002) that entails that Higgins’ emotional sensitivity is reliable.  
 2. Moral emotions are usually thought to involve moral judgements, so for MME to be a 
moral emotion, some theorists (Dixon, 2008, pp. 129–140) would require Higgins to be capable 
of entertaining a proposition such as ‘This creature’s distress is bad.’ It seems safe to assume 
that Higgins, being a dog, cannot entertain such a proposition, for he lacks the requisite 
concepts. However, we can consider that his emotion tracks this proposition. To understand 
what this means, it is important to point out that moral propositions are not merely a record of 
how the world is—the proposition ‘This creature’s distress is bad,’ if true, means that this 
creature’s  distress is indeed a bad thing—, but also have a motivational component, such that, if 
I believe that ‘X’s distress is bad’ is true, then ceteris paribus,  upon seeing that X is in distress, 
I will be moved to help or comfort X. We can establish that Higgins’ distress at Jane’s distress 
(behaviour) tracks the proposition ‘Jane’s distress is bad’ because (a) the experiential form 
Higgins’ emotion takes means that he experiences Jane’s distress as something negative, and (b) 
Higgins’ emotion has the adequate motivational component to it, insofar as, built into his 
distress, is an urge to engage in affiliative behaviour directed at Jane. The moral proposition that 
MME tracks is, in this sense, implicit in the phenomenal character of Higgins' emotion, even 
though he is incapable of explicitly entertaining it. 
 3. The fact that MME tracks the proposition ‘This creature’s distress is bad’ means that 
there is a truth-preserving relation between Higgins’ emotion and this proposition, such that, if 
the emotion is not misguided, then the proposition must be true (see Rowlands, 2012, Chapters 
2, 9). This allows us to say that Higgins’ emotion would be moral even if it were misguided. It 
doesn’t necessarily have to be true that Jane’s distress in these particular circumstances is a bad 
thing. She could be crying simply because she is reading a sad book. In this case, Higgins’ 
MME would be misguided, but we could still say that it tracks this moral proposition because it 
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has the adequate phenomenal character (see the previous paragraph) and because, were it not to 
be misguided, the truth of this proposition would be guaranteed. 
 4. The fact that Higgins' emotion has Jane's distress (behaviour) as its intentional object, 
makes MME come closer to being a reason for his helping behaviour, rather than a mere cause. 
Recall the ants in the experiment we saw in the introduction (Nowbahari et al., 2009). Their 
helping behaviour was presumably triggered by a ‘chemical call for help’ from their entrapped 
conspecific (Nowbahari et al., 2009, p. 3) and probably had no cognitive or affective 
component. Their conspecific’s call for help was the cause of their behaviour. In the case of 
Higgins, his behaviour is triggered by an emotion with intentional content, which turns MME 
into what Higgins should feel, given the circumstances. Higgins not only helps Jane; he does 
so on the basis of a motivation that has an adequate phenomenal character. This allows us, as 
external evaluators, to say that he helps her for the right reasons. 
 5. MME resembles the phenomenology of what us humans often experience when being 
moved by another's distress to help or comfort her. Explicitly thinking ‘This person's distress is 
bad’ is not usually a step along the way—we may even be considered callous if we need to stop 
and make this sort of consideration before helping someone in distress. The fact that we can 
engage in this sort of considerations post hoc (‘It was good of me to help her, after all, her 
distress was a bad thing’) is relevant when it comes to granting us moral agency, but our 
behaviour before engaging in these considerations was already moral in character—because it 
was triggered by an emotion of the appropriate sort. Since we are only considering granting 
moral subjecthood to Higgins, and not moral agency, the fact that his motivation to comfort 
Jane is phenomenologically similar to what ours would be like is surely relevant. 
 6. MME, being a fairly reliable disposition to react emotionally to others’ distress, can 
be considered a character trait of Higgins’, and since it incorporates an urge to engage in 
affiliative behaviour, we can say that it systematically produces good consequences, for it will 
tend towards alleviating others’ distress. This is enough, on some de-intellectualised accounts of 
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virtues (Driver, 2006), to consider that Higgins is virtuous. The fact that MME systematically 
produces good consequences also allows us to evaluate Higgins’ MME-based behaviour, from 
an objective consequentialist perspective, as morally good. While we cannot praise Higgins for 
his behaviour, we can say that it is ‘a good thing that the world contains a subject like this, an 
individual who acts in this way’ (Rowlands, 2012, p. 254). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Does morality require mindreading? We have seen that moral psychologists consider that 
mindreading is contingently involved whenever humans engage in moral judgements. Instead of 
questioning this claim, I have focused on arguing that mindreading capacities are not among the 
cognitive requirements for moral behaviour to obtain. I understand that an individual behaves 
morally whenever she behaves on the basis of moral motivations. The category of moral 
subjecthood, introduced by Rowlands (2011; 2012), allows us to separate moral motivation 
from moral responsibility. Moral subjects are beings who behave on the basis of moral 
motivations, and they need not be worthy of praise or blame. Contrary to what Cova (2013) 
argues, moral responsibility probably cannot be separated from moral judgement. We can, 
however, construct a minimal account of moral emotions (a type of moral motivation) that will 
be independent of both moral judgement and moral responsibility. Using the example of MME, 
I have argued that an individual could behave on the basis of an emotion that possessed an 
identifiable moral content, even if she lacked all capacity to mindread and engage in moral 
judgements. I have also argued that Nichols (2001) has not provided us with any convincing 
reason to suppose that MME couldn’t provide the adequate motivation for an individual to 
engage in other-directed helping or comforting behaviour. In the final section, I introduced a 
systematic definition of MME, and gave a list of reasons why we should consider that whoever 
behaves on the basis of MME is, indeed, a moral subject. If my arguments have been correct, 
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the case for animal morality should be considered independent of the case for animal 
mindreading. 
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